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Information Systems for 
Mine Action from the 
Data Entry Point of View 
This article aims to provide readers with a closer insight into the endeavors 
of creating an information system and problems related with keeping data 
consistent and up to date, especially from the point of data entry. The author 
strives to provide honest and direct insight into the problems and solutions 
found while supporting mine action activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
by Zoran Grujic, Assistant 
Director of Information, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Mine 
Action Center 
Chronology 
Mine acr ion in Bosn ia a nd 
Herzegovina started in March 1996. The 
basis was the obligation offormer warring 
factions to submit all minefield reports and 
dear all of rhe minefields within thei r area 
of responsibility. Wanting to sore our the 
mine problem and being aware of a lack 
of expertise and technical resources, the 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is-
sued an appeal to the international 
community in January 1996 to provide 
help and kick-starr the program. 
As a result, the fi rst set of equipment 
and the fi rst ream offoreign experts came 
to Bosnia in March 1996, and thei r first 
task was to set up a database capable of 
dealing with the mine problem in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The initial database 
system was developed by the FGM Com-
pany, and it was up and running as of 
July 1996. The first set of data was given 
to the United Nations Mine Action Cen-
ter (UNMAC) by the Implementation 
Forces for the Dayton peace agreement 
(IFOR). At that rime, humanitarian stan-
dards were nor created and a favored 
approach was mine lift ing. 
After July 1998, all the assets were 
submitted to the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
authorities. From the database point of 
view, that meant chat data entry was to 
be decentralized to rhe Entity mine ac-
tion centers (MACs), and more chan that, 
Entity MACs were responsible fo r re-
porting to their governments and the 
donor coun tries. The UNMAC had a 
centralized structure char las red until July 
1998. From that rime unti l Februa ry 
2001, we had a tripartite structure com-
posed of the MAC for rhe Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the MAC of 
Republika Srpska, and rhe Bosnia and 
Herzegovina MAC (BHMAC) ar the 
state level, which has rhe cask of coordi-
nating activities between Entity MACs 
and maimaining central activities like 
standards, accreditation and databases. 
T ime proved chat there was a need 
to centralize some functions. As a firs t 
step, it was necessary ro create some sort 
of "umbrella" for MACs ro work under. 
As a reaction to char need, the M inistry 
of Civil Affairs and Communications was 
chosen in September 2000 to channel 
activities on behalf of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina government. T he Board of 
Donors provided the necessary infl uence 
of the international communi ty. A new 
Demining Commission was appointed as 
a part of the M in istry of Civi lAffairs and 
Communications. 
Knowledge gained by chat time also 
proved that an entirely new structure was 
needed. Parr of these thoughts are in-
cluded in the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
demining law. As a result, the fo llowing 
has happened: 
• February 2002: Demining law for 
Bosnia and H erzegovina put in power 
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• March 2002: 10-year strategic 
plan presented 
• April 2002: Decision made to 
establish the BHMAC as a state body 
institution 
• July 2002: Council of M inisters 
appointed new director 
Back to the Subject 
Having an information "system" in 
place was actually just the tip of rhe ice-
berg. The real challenge was ro populate 
the database with meaningful informacion. 
Mine action systems are nor data-
entry intensive at the late stage of the 
project. On the contrary, data entry is the 
only meaningful activity that can be done 
at the early stages of rhe project, and this 
is the data-entry intensive phase. 
T he Bosnia and Herzegovina infor-
mation system starred wirh 16,600 
minefield reportS including some 300 
tasks and 300 mine incidents entered by 
IFOR. Today's sys tem has 18,300 
minefield reporrs, 2,000 incidents and 
more than 3,000 casks. In fact, after rhe 
creation of database systems, rhe aurhor 
rends to declare it as "perfect" (or slightly 
better), but the fi rst data entry usually 
provides the fi rst d isappointments. 
The fac t char is mostly forgotten 
while a database is being created is that 
the da ra entry personnel are the fl rst cus-
tomers to p lease. The entire quality of rhe 
information system depends on the ini-
tial entry of data. An additional problem 
is either a shortage of informacion sources 
or roo many of them. The best example 
for th is is rhe point where one has ro 
choose which coordinate system, ellipsoid 
or map background to use. My opinion 
is that there is no common solution for 
this; it is impossible to compare mapping 
needs for a country as big as Afghan is ran 
versus Bosn ia and H erzegovina or one 
even smaller. 
O nce the database system is in place 
and running, the next cask is ro link the 
MAC with the local government. Al-
though it may sound easy, it is not. Most 
of the data that are necessary for daily ac-
tivities are also matters of dai ly policies, so 
it is not very often chat one finds some-
body ro talk and exchange information 
with. Based on our experience, it was very 
easy to organize meetings, less easy to sign 
some sort of Memorandum of Under-
standing and even less easy to exchange 
information. In recent days, the situation 
has changed, bur nor signi ficantly. 
Because of the face char wrong entries 
made at the inirial phase very rarely get rec-
tified, it is never enough to emphasize the 
importance of the initial data entry, since it 
sets up ground for h1rther mistakes. Reasons 
may vary-understaffing, increased amount 
of work or sometimes pure laziness. 
If Possible, e 
W ill be Made 
istake 
T he most common mistakes in my 
experience are figures mismatched while 
entering coordinates, like entering BP 
345345 instead of BP 345354. The er-
ror is harder ro find as we go right (coward 
smaller uni ts). The only possibil ity to 
avoid this is some sort of automated data 
entry for coordinates, which has become 
possible only recently by rhe provision of rhe 
differential G lobal Positioning System 
(GPS) for fleld work. Additional prob-
lems could be described as: 
• Us ing any comment field for all of 
those things that should have been en-
cered elsewhere 
• Tampering with tables without suf-
ficient knowledge on data structure by 
applying rhe "I-will-creare-a-reporr-by-
myself" approach 
• Deleting records 
One possible way of rectifYing rhe 
mistakes after entry is ro conduce signifi-
cant field activity, with very little impact co 
final data quality. For instance, in the terri-
tory of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a "Systematic Survey" rook 
place. The idea was to calk with all munici-
pal authorities and to make them express 
their concerns on mine contamination, and 
to gather informacion on confrontation lines Because of their accuracy, cadastral maps are 
and possible risk areas together with some the best for reporting on humanitarian 
sort of prioritization for these areas. After one deming activities in our experience. 
yearofacriviries, the final result had less then Raster data in use by the Bosnia and 
I 0 percent of new data, and yet we were not Herzegovina information system for mine 
in a position to put all docs representing action are as fo llows: 
minefield re- 1: 1,000,000 Scanned and registered, 
po n s in the satellite images for the scale are available 
proper places. 1: 300,000 Scanned and registered 
a sics 
fthe 
1: 200,000 Scanned and registered 
1: 100,000 Satellite image for region 
1: 50,000 Scanned and registered M 709 and S 1002 , 
1: 25,000 
Whi l e 
> 1: 25,000 
c reating an 
satellite images available for five regions 
Scanned and 60 percent registered 
Available scanned and registered 
information system for mine action, some 
decisions need to be made about rhe da-
tabase engine and th e Geograp h ic 
Information System (GIS) software. For 
rhe Bosnia and Herzegovina system, these 
decisions were made at the very begin-
ning by the FGM Company, giving us 
Maplnfo 4 .0 as GIS and Paradox 7.0 as a 
database engine. Lacer on, although sev-
eral other software products were on the 
market, we decided that this winning 
team should remain intact, and today we 
are running our system on Paradox 9.0 
and Maplnfo 6.5. ln order to avoid prob-
lems with different geodesy parameters 
(projection and ellipsoid), we decided to 
use an interim solution, Lar/Long and 
WGS 84. We also decided to split data 
by keeping descriptive data with the da-
tabase engine and keeping spacial data 
linked to their descriptions within the 
GIS part of the information system. 
Vector data are being processed by use 
of an exported .dbf file having vector data 
input finalized by rhe use of the drawing 
tools. T his rather odd solution was chosen 
to give the data entry personnel the ability 
to check all coordinates once again prior to 
entering the shape into the database. 
Regarding raster data, after several tries 
with Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)/ 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
(NIMA) maps, satellite images and a variety 
of other sources, we came to the conclusion 
that maps used by warring factions during 
rhe conflict are the best possible backdrop 
for initial minefield data entry and planning, 
if available. The reason for this is the easy 
identification of rhe reference points taken 
from them at the rime of the report creation. 
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In order to improve rhe accuracy of there-
porting, GPS is in use (less 20 em accuracy) . 
nee ou Have It 
One way or another, the informa-
tion system will most likely be the fi rst 
visible parr of any MAC; rhus, all the 
training will be done according to the in-
formation system in use. Since we are 
dealing with mine affected countries, or 
countries that have just finished a war, it 
is unlikely chat one can be in a situation 
to hire pre-trained staff. More likely, ini-
tial education will be provided to further 
inform department staff members and 
later on hopefully propagated through a 
kind of help desk provided to the rest of 
the staff. Being the first departmenr up 
and running, and being attractive because 
of its results, this becomes the most ex-
posed department and takes significant 
role in PR activities. 
Looking at things from the other 
perspective, all possible errors that will 
occur while prioritizing or making peri-
odical reports, any kind of propaganda, 
or any fundraising materials will be au-
romarically attached co "wrong data 
provided by the database," making them 
perfect victims for all other errors. 
My experience says that besides la-
ziness of the staff- there is no other term 
for nor entering data char is available-
another significant reason is a line of 
thinking something like this: "Wh en data 
starr talking, people will ask questions. l f 
we don't enter (provide) them, we are on 
the safe side." Surprisingly enough, it is 
not only the local side that gets blamed. 
1
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The only way to sort out the problem 
was ro create the law that will force infor-
mation flow and get the system running. 
Need to ave 
So what could be a solution ro have 
an information system and have data en-
tered into it? First, an absolute necess ity 
is ro have clear, well-defined proced ures 
providing as much data as poss ible and, 
if possible, have ir organized in such a 
way that they can be entered inro an in-
formation system with a lot of predefined 
va lues. In order to emphasize rhe impor-
tance of certain fields, ir is advisable ro 
have some fields that must be entered as 
a condition to proceed. 
Another problem is how to keep the 
entered information. Our experience 
shows that there are rwo solutions: either 
not delete records (just declare them can-
celed) or have well-fo rmed and carefully 
programmed routines for record deletion. 
Over rime and with the expansion of ac-
tivities, it becomes obvious rhar some sort 
of traceability has robe implemented, and 
ideally, there should be a printed journal 
file (log book for major changes). 
A need to have a chance to educate 
and re-educate staff is more related to 
program managers, as they often forger 
the simple fact char one may gain knowl-
edge nor only through trial and error, bur 
also by attending seminars. This is nor 
only more cost-effective, bur it also ere-
ares a sense of importance for the staff 
and in the long run creates a bener envi-
ronment and more effective employees. 
Besides the problems mentioned so 
far, there are also some po ints that sim-
ply can nor be over looked. When the staff 
moves, things are forgotten. Being (at 
least in Bosnia) the first organization in 
place maintaining a live database, the staff 
educated during rhe process become an 
asset desired by other companies. By rule, 
salaries reflect funding, and iris difficult 
ro keep quality staff together. 
Another problem is purely physical: 
paper copies are inclined to disappear or 
get damaged by manipulation. W ith luck 
(from the program's point of view), the 
amount of activities is growing and rhe 
paper archive is growing, which means 
more data to enter. A solut ion would be 
to ~can all the reports and to use the 
scanned images as information carriers. 
Sraremenrs rhar say rhar minefield 
report clara lose their importance with 
time are simply wrong. In the end, they 
become the only wrinen proof of con-
tamination. A survey report, while an 
expert's opi nion, is still just an opinion 
on the possible mine risk for certain areas. 
rioritization and the 
nformation System 
I t is not always easy to find a 
mathematic algorithm to define priori-
ties. Sometimes even scoring does not 
help; for instance, the complicated stare 
structure reflects procedures for priority 
definition. Also, the term "impact " can 
be understood in many d ifferent ways. 
Speaking of complexity, here is a Bosnia 
and Herzegovina state structure equation: 
1 Stare+ [I Entity+ I Entity (I 0 Can-
tons)+ District] = 14 Governments 
Taking into consideration the fact 
char rea l executive autho ri ty lies in mu-
nicipalities (more than 120), it becomes 
obvious why priorities cannot be defined 
based just on some "points." 
Through six years of data collection, 
we learned that where the mines are and 
the real impact of rhem on the popula-
tion and society is the question. The 
problem is that priorities have ro reflect 
needs and be part of plans for develop-
ment as desired by authorities. Otherwise 
ir's simply not working. 
outheastern urope 
pproach 
ln order ro have a broader scope and 
ro share experience with neighboring 
countries, we used an opportunity kindly 
provided by the European Commission 
(EC) to starr a project on regional data shar-
ing. So far, rhe beneficiaries of the project 
are the following countries in southeastern 
Europe (SEE) region: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and 
Azerbaijan-and chis list is likely to expand. 
So far, we have sent four exports ro 
the Joint Research Center and informa-
t ion interchange has proven possible. 
Based on data inconsistency, it becomes 
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obvious that some sort of standardization 
has to rake place. Th us, we agreed on 
standard hardware and software packages. 
In order to be able ro show data for the 
region on a single map, we agreed on ba-
sics for use of the satellite images, and we 
have images provided for the region. 
Prior to the information inrerchange, 
we had a fou r-day meeting in Sarajevo 
yielding some information interchange 
core standards for SEE. 1 Based on experi-
ence gained through these activities, 
exported data sent could be harmonized. 
Once a standard for information inter-
change is provided, information can be 
interchanged. An exporting exercise helped 
a lor because some of the mistakes became 
visible. A "house cleaning" was necessary. 
More than that, countries within the re-
g io n are helping each other sorr out 
problems. A good illustration of this is the 
BH MAC's GPS campaign in Albania. 
Since all participants provided data 
without any problems, SEE could be used 
as an example of equali ty in divers ity. In 
f:1ct, once the "one-size-does-not- fi r-all" 
phi losophy was accepted, it was consid-
erably easy to achieve awareness on 
info rmario n-shari ng benefl ts. 
Having seen all aspects ofinformarion 
sharing and cooperation, I think it is rime 
for the Global Information Exchange Stan-
dard for mine action. We fully support rhe 
Mine Action Extensible Markup Language 
(maXML) initiative, which becomes more 
and more accepted as a standard protocol 
for information interchange. • 
Endnotes 
I. Results of the conference can be seen at 
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The BHMAC: 
A New Law, New Structure and New 
Hope in Bosnia 
After years of struggling w ith an inefficient m ine action structure, a new 
demining law has revitalized t he Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine Action Center 
(BHMAC). Bosnians f inally have the means t o conquer their landmine 
troubles. 
by JJ Scott, MAIC 
Introduction 
A new law enacted in March of2002 
marked the beginning of a Bosnian mine 
action renaissance that will improve ev-
erything from na t ional program 
management to individual minefield pro-
cedures. A complete restructuring and 
reorganization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Mine Action Center (BHMAC) will fi-
nally aiJow the "head" of Bosnian mine 
action to effectively d irect the bodies be-
neath it, and to responsibly report ro rhe 
govern ment through the Demining 
Commission. The Bosnian government 
formulated the demining law and will 
help fund irs implementation-an ex-
trao rdinary step toward its goal of 
effective national program ownership. 
The new law and the structures it creates 
fi nally give Bosnian mine action practi-
tio ners a management system that is 
attuned to their own culture and unique 
land mine situation- indispensable weap-
ons in the struggle to free their nation 
from the landmines holding it hostage. 
History/War 
Over rhree years of fighting ( 1992-
1995) among several different armies 
along undulating front lines left "a very 
complicated and extensive [landmine] 
problem in a complex envi ronment," says 
Mr. D avid Rowe, Program Manager of 
the United Nations Development Pro-
g ram ( UND P) and adviser to the 
BHMAC, Demining Commission and 
International Board of Donors. Mr. Rowe 
moved ro Bosnia during the war and has 
been involved in Bosnian mine action 
since rhe beginning. He has survived rhe 
BHMAC's progression from mine action 
side-show to center-stage attraction. 
To appreciate the turnaround now 
raking place, some background is neces-
sary. Mr. Rowe describes the mine threat 
left by the war as "quire complex because 
of its extent, because of its low density 
and because of irs random nature," mak-
ing "the landmi ne problem here less 
quantifiable than in other pans of rhe 
world." 
Knowing refugees and imernally dis-
placed persons (lOPs) would soon try 
returning home, rhe United Nations set 
up a mine action center in 1996. The 
inrernarional community decided char 
Bosnians should run their own mine ac-
tion program, handing over all 
responsibilities on July I, 1998. The 
Bosnians inherited a srrucwre rhat was 
"a development program in a l 00 per-
cen r task-o riented en vi ron men r. . . , a 
decision perhaps more designed ro ac-
commod ate polit ical n eeds than 
immediate practical pose-war consider-
ations," says Mr. Rowe. Under char 
structure, the State-level BHMAC was 
essentially subservient to rhe rwo rela-
tively autonomous Entity MACs (one 
representing rhe Federation of Bosnia-
H erzegovina and one for the Republ ic of 
Srbska), effectively preventing it from 
wielding any real managerial influence 
over demining operations. Many in 
Bosnia feel that the United Nations 
handed the program over to Bosnian au-
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rhorities a bit roo early, before either rhe 
MAC or the Bosnian government was 
ready. 
By late 2000, a budget crisis created 
and exacerbated by allegations of corrup-
tion and mis at the 
-.-..~~~ 
A BHMAC truck waits behind the BHMAC 
headquarters, beside the Marshal Tito 
Barracks . 
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